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Abstract 
The present article attempts to draw a general analytical framework within which to 
reconsider the notion of the self in the wide interdisciplinary field of social thought. 
This reconsideration pertains to the self as a fluid social process and as an interrela-
tional meaningful outcome constituent of lived experience, which is neither intrapsy-
chically located, nor able to be defined in isolation, as something “in and of itself ”. The 
self is therefore seen as paradoxically both autonomous and interdependent, that is 
reflexively open, socially embedded and interactively constituted. Our critical histor-
icising interrogation also highlights the inherently dialogical nature, character, and 
dynamics of the self in contemporary society, thus opening up the conceptual space 
to better grasp, theorise, and evaluate the irreducible complexity of self-formation.
Keywords: Self-Formation; Existentialism; Phenomenology; Social Saturation; Di-
alogical Self and Reflexivity        
102 Epiphany: Journal of Transdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, (2015) © Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
C. Tsekeris
Introduction  
In general, theorising the notion of the self does not pertain to a clear, coherent, 
and commonly agreed history, and is indisputably not an easy thing (see Lev-
ine, 1985; Ormay, 2012; Barresi, 2002; Tsekeris, 2015). Additionally, in spite of 
the large number of relevant studies, the social scientific understanding of the 
self ’s “influence on behaviour, remains far from adequate” (Spinelli, 2005, p. 76).
Nowadays, however, it is strongly and interdisciplinarily acknowledged and accept-
ed that the individual self is social to the core “because the processes of mind are the 
same as social processes. Both are processes of communicative interacting and power 
relating between human bodies in which individual minds form and are formed by 
social relations at the same time” (Stacey, 2003, p. 17). As Jean-Francois Lyotard in his 
influential Postmodern Condition has imaginatively put it, “no self is an island; each 
exists in a fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before. 
Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at ‘nodal point’ 
of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be” (Lyotard, 1986, p. 15).
Hence, the self is relational through and through (Donati, 2014), that is, simul-
taneously subjective and social (Goffman, 1959; Simmel, 1971; Cooley, 1907), 
rather than a reified, separate, and lonely individual possession, that is, an enti-
ty “intrapsychically located, or able to be defined in isolation (as something ‘in 
and of itself ’) or that it is the impetus to consciousness” (Spinelli, 2001, p. 43).
The issue of reflexivity is crucial here. According to the pragmatist perspective of 
George Herbert Mead, in particular, meaning is not based on the mere psycholog-
ical (esoteric) constitution of the individual, but rather on the relational and inter-
dependent “structure of social praxis” (Mead 1973, p. 69). Therefore, any human 
act indeed produces meaning if only it sufficiently contains an element of social re-
flexivity, which ensures the presence of symbolic consciousness (Mead 1973, p. 90).
The everyday lifeworldly process of thinking and internalising the general-
ised other is “the very first stage of experience in the creation and develop-
ment of the self ” (Mead 1973, p. 147). As Charles Cooley comprehensive-
ly put it, “self and society go together, as phases of a common whole” (Cooley 
1907, p. 678). Self and otherness constitute a mutually constitutive process.
In the same spirit, the Croatian Protestant theologian Miroslav Volf (1996) per-
ceptively elaborates on the innovative and influential conception of the oth-
er as occupying the self in the unceasing synergetic process of self-construction:
The human self is formed … through a complex process of ‘taking in’ and 
‘keeping out.’ … a result of a distinction from the other and the internal
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The article then moves to briefly describe and discuss the rich and com-
plex historicity of the self, as well as to highlight and assess some of its cur-
rent epistemological elaborations, namely the existential-phenomenolog-
ical framing and the notions of “social saturation” and “dialogical self ”.
Historicising the Self 
Within contemporary social science, many scholars variously promote the idea 
that the self is a discursive, cultural, or historical construct, or relate it to hu-
man nature, personality, personhood, subjectivity, cognition, memory, or con-
sciousness (the experience of self-awareness). Some others, who follow the 
neurobiological approach, define it exclusively in terms of the brain and neu-
ro-anatomy, or theorise it as a product of the genome (Churchland, 2013).
De Villiers and Cilliers (2004) integratively “model” the self as an evolutionary and ma-
terial entity, “an emergent property of the complex system that consists of our mental 
apparatus, environment and language” (De Villiers and Cilliers, 2004, p. 52). In gen-
eral, since William James’s Principles of Psychology (1900), our theoretical and meth-
odological understanding of the concept has changed significantly (Barresi, 2002).
But the roots of the self can be traced back to classical antiquity. Although not explicit-
ly using the word “self ”, Socrates was the first who delineated a comprehensive onto-
logical, epistemological and ethical framework for the systematic scholarly study of 
it, “through introspection and dialectic – through the interpersonal pursuit of truth. 
Thus, Socrates’ implicit notion of the self is relational; the self is discovered in the 
process of discourse and dialogue with others” (Levin, 1992, p. 14). The intriguing re-
flexive imperative to know thyself, as it was written in the front of the famous temple 
of Apollo at Delphi, has exercised an enormous intellectual impact, as well as an “en-
during moral fascination on generation after generation of thinkers” (Pels, 2000, p. 1).
Knowing yourself is for Socrates a unique virtue, not a Kantian descent into hell; 
it is therefore the central task for each person, since the unengaged, impassion-
ate, and “unexamined life is not worth living” (Levin, 1992, p. 14). Exercising his 
own reflexivity, Nietzsche perceptively maintains that any great theoretical system 
equals to a self-confession on the part of its author “and a kind of involuntary and 
unconscious memoir” (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 37). Within such analytical contexts, re-
ization of the relationship to the other; it arises out of the complex histo-
ry of ‘differentiation’ in which both the self and the other take part by ne-
gotiating their identities in interaction with one another (Volf, 1996: 66).
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flexive inquiry arguably pertains to an implicit notion that there is “a complexity 
and mystery about the self, that the self is a largely unexplained continent, the riv-
ers, fields, and mountains of which are unknown to us” (Levin, 1992, pp. 14-15).
Furthermore, the irreducibly complex and nonlinear “nature” of the self seems to go 
hand in hand with its essentially conflictual character (see Spinelli, 2001). In his famous 
dialogue Phaedrus, Plato (1961) was the very first to depict the self as conflictual, “as 
being constituted by what Freud called ‘agencies of the mind’ … Self here is split and 
in constant conflict between opposing forces and tendencies” (Levin, 1992, p. 15).
In Phaedrus, more specifically, Plato imaginatively describes a tripartite model 
of the self, “using the metaphor of the chariot driver trying to control two spir-
ited steeds. The chariot driver represents reason and control, a function akin to 
that of Freud’s ego; one steed represents appetite and is a close relative of Freud’s 
id, while the other steed represents ambition (i.e., the pursuit of narcissistic grat-
ification). The second horse is also to be understood as the ‘spirited’ part of the 
self. There is no parallel to Freud’s superego in Plato’s model. The chariot driver 
is in perpetual need of establishing control over his horses” (Levin, 1992, p. 15).
In direct opposition to both Platonic perfection (idealism) and Cartesian re-
ductionistic simplicity and cognitivism (or mentalism), Freud (1949) orig-
inally conceptualises human inner life as pertaining to a hugely complex 
system that contains a mysterious and unconscious dynamics, that is, a 
hidden deterministic dynamics of libidinal, instinctual, and emotional character.
In the contemporary epoch of late or high modernity, the self has rapidly be-
come more emotional, but also more active, more intentional, and more trans-
parent (yet complex and nonlinear), pertaining to a continuous open re-
flexive project (Giddens, 1991), or biographies of choice (Beck, 1992). As a 
consequence, identity (the traits possessed by a self) is now radically trans-
formed “from a given into a task” (Bauman, 2001, p. 144; see also Elliott, 2001).
Nowadays, individuals are increasingly obliged to cope with chaos, uncertain-
ty and living at risk, to find new life styles and design new life strategies, to seek 
to maximise their creativity and life chances, to take action in order to increase 
the quality of their lives, and to act prudently in relation to themselves and oth-
ers. As life has become a strategic enterprise, the social and theoretical categories 
of health and illness have become vehicles for re-inventing the self and exercis-
ing subjectivities endowed with the faculties of choice and will (Greco, 1993).
As active biological citizens, we are also required to diligently pursue life-long learn-
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ing and perpetual self-assessment, to constantly monitor our health, and to carefully 
manage emerging risks and susceptibilities. The formation of the self now inevitably 
takes place “in the languages and rhetorics of contemporary bioscience and biomed-
icine. Citizenship takes on new biological colourations and hope becomes bound up 
with scientific truth” (Rose, 2001, p. 12). Thus, the self becomes more relational.
Existential-Phenomenological Considerations  
Relationalism overtly stands against any philosophical or sociological attempt to 
“essentialise” or “substantialise” the self (Tsekeris, 2013). The so called “relational 
reason” (Donati, 2014) consistently refrains from any old epistemological claim for 
a transcendental observer of all observers, which would rather amount to a con-
tingent attempt to reduce the complexity and contingency of the self and the social 
world. In the same dynamical spirit, the existential-phenomenological tradition 
informs contemporary social science and champions the inherently protean, non-
linear and processual nature of the self, over against both totality and individuali-
ty/separateness, as well as both a false transcendence and an empty concreteness.
Most characteristically, Soren Kierkegaard’s original and substantial philosoph-
ical approach to human subjectivity perceptively includes both objectivity and 
subjectivity, the world and the self, as grounded in concrete, lived human ex-
istence: “The self is the ‘intermediate determinant’ between psyche and soma 
and relates itself to both ... Kierkegaard’s individualism is not egotistic or nar-
cissistic; rather, it is relational in both relating itself to itself and relating itself 
to the Power that constitutes it. Kierkegaard explicitly warns against narcissis-
tic self-absorption and schizoid withdrawal” (Levin, 1992, p. 126; see also Stew-
art, 2011). This processual, anti-essentialist and anti-substantialist worldview 
is also obvious in Ernesto Spinelli’s “meta-dialogical” existential-phenomeno-
logical reconstructions on the relationally dependent self (Spinelli, 2001; 2005).
Existential-phenomenological reconstructions overtly signify that the self is contra-
dictory, “paradoxical” or “polarised” (Schneider, 2013). Most importantly, we are not 
closed, distinct and separate entities, but open (Heideggerian) beings-in-the-world, 
deeply immersed in the inescapable conflicted complexity of a networked social reali-
ty. The meaningful lived perception and experience (in the here and now) of ourselves 
and others “emerge of, and through and irreducible grounding of relatedness … no 
self can be ‘found’, nor individual ‘emerge’ other than via the a priori interrelational 
grounding from which our unique sense of being arises” (Spinelli, 2007, pp. 12, 14).
For Spinelli, who follows a Sartrean existential line of thought, relatedness essen-
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tially entails anxiety, uncertainty, and nonlinearity, as well as “co-operation with 
one another not because we have eradicated the conflict between us, but rath-
er because our attempt at ‘being for’ one another arises through the mutual rec-
ognition of the inevitable conflict between us” (Spinelli, 2004, p. 62). Both co-
operation and uniqueness emerge from our (unresolved) shared relatedness.
This explicitly rejects both the Scylla of subjectivism and the Charybdis of 
objectivism, in favor of a promising relational intersubjectivity, as famous-
ly echoed by the intersubjective existential-phenomenologist Martin Buber 
and his reflexive distinction between “I-It” and “I-Thou” (Buber, 2004). That 
means, “I can experience and relate to another as an object of my experience 
and self-consciousness and whose meanings can be reshaped and reformulat-
ed via the imposition of my preferred meaning stance” (Spinelli, 2005, p. 123).
For Buber (1947), dialogue implies that you cannot be the same as the Oth-
er. Having difference is an essential precondition to relationally bridge to anoth-
er. This dialogics of self interprets and reconstructs “the self as ‘becoming’ on 
the boundaries of self and other, identity and difference” (Tziovas, 2003, p. 8).
The complex interrelational relationship between identity and otherness paved 
the radical philosophical way for the introduction of second-person intersub-
jective methodologies, such as the Bohmian interhuman dialogue, leading to in-
novative forms of dialogic consciousness (Bohm, 1985; see also Tsekeris, 2012). 
Ultimately, any original human experience is intrinsically grounded in an inter-
personal relatedness between interacting social subjects: “One cannot become a 
human being in the abstract […] Embeddedness is endemic to human experience 
– I become the person I am in interaction with others. The way I feel it necessary 
to be with them is the person I take myself to be” (Mitchell, 1988, pp. 275-276).
This profoundly posits once again the indispensable level of meaningful social in-
teraction (in the living present) as the fundamental level of individual and collec-
tive behaviour, as well as of the personal and societal dynamics (Stacey, 2003). In 
addition, the emergent interrelational notion of the self-as-process radically tran-
scends habituated scholarly dualisms and explicitly incorporates uncertainty as a 
ubiquitous feature of human social existence. As Jerome Bruner rightly observes, 
“when we enter human life, it is as if we walk on stage into a play whose enactment 
is already in progress – a play whose somewhat open plot determines what part we 
may play and toward what denouements we may be heading” (Bruner, 1990, p. 34).
Also, the self-as-process directly opposes to the “traditional” or “received” linear 
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notion that our “inside” consists of different, separate and distinct levels or zones, 
functioning autonomously of each other and capable of being studied autonomous-
ly. Psychoanalysis, for instance, traditionally and erroneously tends to think of the 
“unconscious“ – perceived as an “id” – as the most important thing in the whole 
psychological structure (Elias, 1982, pp. 284-285; see also Spinelli, 2001; 2005).
Over against process reduction and the old obsolete model of homo clausus, 
in Norbert Elias’s (1970) scholarly Latin, our individuality is of necessity in-
fused with our networked social existence, and vice versa; they are both mu-
tually involved in an ongoing relational process of simultaneous (nonline-
ar) co-evolution, an “endless dance of co-emergence” (Waldrop, 1992, p. 75).
Social Saturation and the Dialogical Self  
This interdisciplinary line of relational argumentation is imaginatively followed and 
furthered by Kenneth Gergen’s (2001) influential phenomenological and construction-
ist concept of the saturated self, which is strongly supported by a series of experiments 
(Gergen, 1971). The saturated self refers to the dramatic explosion of nonlinear relations 
(real, virtual, and imagined) in which the social individual is increasingly engaged.
In a sense, this notion of the human self pertains to a huge “expansion and com-
plexifying of the individual’s repertoire of ‘ways of being’ (e.g., attitudes, values, 
opinions, moralities, styles of relating), a compounding of evaluative stand-
ards applied to the self, an infinite expansion of opportunity, and an expanding 
sea of obligations. One becomes multiphrenic” (Gergen, 2007, original italics).
Social saturation and irreducible relational embeddedness, inseparability, and in-
terdependence intimately amount to a major epistemological and historical shift 
in the well-respected romanticist and modernist (individually-centred) concep-
tions of the self. These are now actively and irreversibly replaced by “a postmod-
ern conception of the self as inseparable from relationship. Replacing Descartes’s 
centerpiece of the Enlightenment, ‘I think, therefore I am’, life in a socially saturat-
ed world invites the conclusion, ‘I am connected, therefore I am’” (Gergen, 2007). 
In other words, individual selfhood has a foundational inter-relational grounding.
But although the saturated self ambitiously starts to offer a kind of promising al-
ternative to the self-serving, static, atomistic and narcissistic self, it seems dif-
ficult to avoid the common postmodern pitfalls of the self as a (reductionist) 
mode of linguistic construction, as well as of the tenuous, decentered, provision-
al, inconsistent/incoherent and fragmented social agency (see Stepnisky, 2006).
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This is rather more adequately addressed by the social psychological and epis-
temological concept of the dialogical self, originally conceived by Hermans, 
Kempen and van Loon (1992) and heavily inspired from American theorists 
of the self, like William James and George Herbert Mead, as well as from the 
Russian dialogical school in the tradition of Mikhail Bakhtin’s innovative the-
ory of dialogism and heteroglossia in literary creation (see Barresi, 2002).
In general terms, the dialogical self refers to a dynamic interrelational multiplicity 
of I-positions within both internal and external interchanges. In a synthetic and 
integrative manner, this dialogical notion overtly acknowledges and celebrates both 
the modern emphasis on critical self-agency and the postmodern analytical focus 
on social construction, language, discourse, and power relations (Richardson et al., 
1998; Hermans, 2014). The self, including the cyberself, is interdisciplinarily con-
ceptualised here as socially embedded, relationally dynamic, and entirely open to 
an ambiguous otherness, continuously moving toward an uncertain, unforeseen, 
and unpredictable future, without however reaching a final and safe destination.
This general uncertainty is fundamentally coupled with a permanent nonline-
ar sense of playfulness, experimentation, fluidity and flexibility. Although the 
dialogical self is always bound to particular positions in time and space (includ-
ing cyberspace), it also has the unique critical-reflexive capacity to imaginative-
ly change or modify positions in accordance with various nonlinear fluctuations 
in situation and time. Fruitful dialogical and nonlinear relations between dif-
ferent positions (possibly pertaining to unequal power) can subsequently de-
velop, because each position is endowed with a voice (perhaps a critical one).
According to such relational dialogical reconstructions, “there is no inner and outer, 
only a body of context and experience which expresses itself in a ‘consummate reciproc-
ity’ in which we discern ourselves through the other” (Gordon, 1991, p. 43). Human 
beings can thus be better understood, studied and theorised in the analytical intersub-
jective context of the complex dynamic interdependencies with their multiple selves, as 
well as with each other, within a constantly changing social and cultural environment.
The creative, fragile, and uncertain process of self-construction, in the par-
ticular form of story-formed identity, profoundly signifies an ongoing nonlin-
ear interplay between subjective aspects of one’s self (i.e. voiced self-aspects or 
I positions), as well as a never-ending interrelational dialogue between inter-
nal I positions and the significant others, with whom the reflexive individual is 
strongly communicating and interacting (Hermans et al., 1992; Hermans, 2014).
Arguably, the relational existence or appearance of these “significant others” 
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(actual, imagined, or implied) is completely integral to the evolutionary re-
flexive (spontaneous) emergence and development of dialogical selfhood. 
Yet, in the original social interpretivist sense of G.H. Mead’s theory, the “oth-
er” is not only the other (significant) person, “but another perspective: anoth-
er way in which the world is judged or appreciated” (Natanson, 1956, p. 64).
Conclusion  
The relational conceptions of “social saturation” and “dialogical self ” seem to be in 
parallel with the advent of liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000), within which the self is 
always and everywhere on the move, flexibly enacted in and through ongoing com-
plex and multiple relations. This also strongly highlights the existential-phenomeno-
logical features of contemporary self-formation. Human beings reflexively constitute 
their relational selves through active dialogical engagement in emergent nonlinear 
processes of practical interdependency. We thus derive relational goods and relational 
evils from acting together (Archer, 2013). The good and the evil dialectically coexist 
in selfhood and our emerging networked social worlds (including the virtual ones).
In complexity terms, the self has the relational capacity to adapt, learn and change, to 
employ appropriate adjustment mechanisms, to maintain diverse and multiple non-
linear strategies and tactics, to explore its relational space of creative possibilities, and 
to encourage dialogue, variety, innovation, and surprise. In times of acute personal 
and social existential crisis, in particular, where the flow of information becomes too 
fast and the world seems to lose its hitherto predictability, controllability and shape, 
the nonlinear system of the self may disintegrate into instability, fall into stagnation, 
or leap to a new meaningful level of order or organisation (dissipative structure), giv-
en the relational empowerment provided by surrounding networks (Tsekeris, 2015).
In this analytical context, contemporary social science, instead of being a “detached 
observer” of human affliction and social loss, must responsibly equip individuals 
and groups with critical skills and practical dialogical competencies to exploit in-
creased social complexity, nonlinearity, turbulence, and chaos. It must also em-
power the suffering individual self to reflexively re-connect with the social and its 
support mechanisms, as well as to effectively search for new fruitful configurations 
regarding social, political and economic citizenship (given the general disaffection 
towards old or traditional forms of citizenship). For contemporary social science, 
in some sense, this is a heavy task of carrying “the weight of the world” (Bourdieu 
et al., 1999), which oppresses people and causes them to suffer in numerous ways.
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